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Abstract
The exploration of advanced information hiding techniques is important to
understand and defend against illicit data extractions over networks. Many techniques
have been developed to covertly transmit data over networks, each differing in their
capabilities, methods, and levels of complexity.
This research introduces a new class of information hiding techniques for use over
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), called the Variable Advanced Network IRC Stealth Handler
(VANISH) system. Three methods for concealing information are developed under this
framework to suit the needs of an attacker.

These methods are referred to as the

Throughput, Stealth, and Baseline scenarios. Each is designed for a specific purpose: to
maximize channel capacity, minimize shape-based detectability, or provide a baseline for
comparison using established techniques applied to IRC.
The effectiveness of these scenarios is empirically tested using public IRC servers
in Chicago, Illinois and Amsterdam, Netherlands. The Throughput method exfiltrates
covert data at nearly 800 bits per second (bps) compared to 18 bps with the Baseline
method and 0.13 bps for the Stealth method. The Stealth method uses Reed-Solomon
forward error correction to reduce bit errors from 3.1% to nearly 0% with minimal
additional overhead. The Stealth method also successfully evades shape-based detection
tests but is vulnerable to regularity-based tests.
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COVERT CHANNELS WITHIN IRC

I.

1.1

Introduction

Motivation
The emergence and growth of the Internet has created a global society dependent

on information systems. Businesses leverage information systems to market products and
aid efficiency, increasing their bottom line. Governments and academia rely on the
Internet for information collection and collaboration. With the growing reliance on
information and information technology, maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive data
stored on computers is paramount to the success and failure of many projects. To this
end, the exploration of information hiding techniques, including steganography and
covert channels, are important to understand and defend against illicit data exfiltration
over networks.
There have been several high-profile cases involving steganography and covert
channel use in the media. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, news spread that the Al-Qaeda agents involved in the attacks used
steganography to covertly communicate while evading detection by federal agents
[CaK01]. A recent case made headlines when U.S. agents examined the computers of 11
captured Russian spies and discovered several steganographic tools used to communicate
sensitive information from the U.S. back to Russia [Eat10].
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It is clear that adversaries use steganography and other covert communication
methods to bypass detection mechanisms. Therefore, investigating new hidden channel
techniques are important to understanding and defending against future attacks.
1.2

Internet Relay Chat for Covert Communications
Nearly any type of network traffic can transmit covert information including text,

images, audio, video, and even unused fields of network packet headers [Cac05].
However, despite its use dating back to 1988, researchers have not focused on IRC as a
means for covert communication. Yet, there are several reasons why IRC is a prime
choice for hidden channels:
•

IRC boasts a large and diverse group of users including business, academia, and
the military [Lea09] [ZLC08] [Eov06].

•

IRC messages are small in size and great in number which makes it difficult to
examine each message thoroughly [Ada08].

•

Botnet masters will likely begin using steganography to disguise their command
and control communications over IRC in 2011 [Lew10].

•

IRC servers act as a man-in-the-middle between the transmitter of the covert data
and their recipient. There is no network trace of the recipient’s IP on the attacked
network, only on server records.

This issue is further compounded by the

proliferation of unregulated IRC servers that do not disclose user identities.
These same servers provide a haven for botnet masters against legal
repercussions.

2

1.3

Steganography and Covert Channels
Within the literature on information hiding, the terms “steganography” and

“covert channel” are often used interchangeably. Steganography is the process through
which a message is hidden within a static medium and can only be seen by a readily
prepared party [KaP00]. Because there are typically large amounts of redundancy, or
unused space, in files or network mediums, it is ideal for concealing large amounts of
data.

Covert channels on the other hand, provide a way to surreptitiously leak

information from an entity in a higher-security level to an entity in a lower level [KaP00].
The difficulty of detecting or eliminating such channels makes them a desirable choice
for adversaries that value stealth over throughput.
There are two types of covert channels: covert storage channels and covert timing
channels. A covert storage channel manipulates the contents of a storage location (e.g.,
disk, memory, packet headers, etc.) to transfer information. A covert timing channel
(CTC) manipulates the timing or ordering of events (e.g., disk accesses, memory
accesses, packet arrivals, etc.) to transfer information.
The two primary design goals of information hiding techniques are high capacity
and detection resistance. However, the pursuit of one of these goals often comes at the
sacrifice of the other [BGM+96].

Previous research has shown that entropy-based

techniques are effective at detecting the presence of CTCs through statistical analysis.
Specifically, the shape [BGC05] [GWW+08] and regularity [CBS04] [SMB06] of
network traffic with covert signals should be effective discriminating factors when
compared to legitimate network samples.
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1.4

Research Goals
This thesis develops new information hiding techniques over IRC and evaluates

their performance using public IRC servers to emulate real scenarios. The system herein
uses steganographic or CTC encoding methods to exfiltrate data with high capacity or
high detection resistance, depending on the needs of the user.
The goals of this research are to:
•

Develop a baseline steganographic system over IRC based on Snow [Kwa06], an
existing steganographic tool for whitespace encoding in text documents. This
serves as the baseline for comparison.

•

Construct a steganographic system maximizing throughput capacity per packet
(CPP) and capacity per second (CPS).

Capacity is the amount of covert

information in the secret file in bits. Therefore, CPP is a function of the size of
the secret file and amount of covert information embedded per packet, while CPS
is dependent on the size of the secret file and the rate at which the covert packets
are transmitted to the IRC server.
•

Build a covert timing channel system which minimizes detectability by “hiding”
in legitimate IRC traffic patterns.

•

Examine and analyze the encoding techniques for reliability, throughput, and
detectability.
The three covert channel techniques are designed under a common modular

framework called the Variable Advanced Network IRC Stealth Handler (VANISH)
system.

The three covert channels under test, maximizing throughput, minimizing
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detectability, and the baseline, are not intended to exhaust all possible information hiding
capabilities over IRC.

Rather, they are meant to show a range of capabilities by

exploiting the IRC protocol in different ways, while maximizing either throughput or
stealth.
1.5

Assumptions and Limitations
There are several assumptions made that allow the covert communications to

occur while also limiting the scope of this research effort. First, these techniques require
access to the victim’s computer to execute the covert channel software. There are a
variety of ways to gain access to target computers including malicious emails, USB
devices, websites, and insider threats; however, it is assumed the malicious code is
already running on the target machine. Second, it is assumed that the computer network
of the infected host does not block or filter IRC traffic. Blocking all IRC traffic is the
best way to prevent these threats.

However, blocking IRC traffic may decrease

productivity of the organization, depending on their use of IRC. In any case, these
techniques could be applied to other types of text-based network traffic with little effort.
Finally, the covert techniques developed do not provide a secure method for exchanging
encryption keys and, following best practice, keys are assumed to be securely exchanged
out-of-band and prior to the covert transmission. While encryption is not necessary for
the covert methods to operate, it adds an extra layer of security to the system in the event
that the covert traffic is discovered while imposing no additional network overhead.
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1.6

Thesis Overview
The remainder of this document is structured as follows.

Chapter 2 covers

background and related work in IRC, steganography, covert timing channels, and their
detection schemes.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to design, setup, and

conduct the experiments to test the effectiveness of the VANISH system. Chapter 4
discusses the VANISH framework, trade studies, and design decisions.

Chapter 5

presents the results and validates the effectiveness of the techniques through
experimentation. Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and discusses directions for
future work.
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II.

T

Literature Review and Related Research

his chapter presents an overview of background information and related research
on Internet Relay Chat (IRC), steganography techniques, covert timing channels,

and the encryption scheme used in this research.

Section 2.1 provides historical

background on IRC as well as its uses today. Section 2.2 discusses the background in
steganography and presents the current research in the field of text-based and whitespace
steganography. Section 2.3 is a literature review of the latest research in the field of
covert timing channels and their detection mechanisms. The RC4 encryption scheme
used in this research is presented in Section 2.4. Finally, the chapter is summarized in
Section 2.5.
2.1

Internet Relay Chat
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) was created in August 1988 by Jarkko Oikarinen as a

means for communication based on the Bulletin Board System [Oik05]. In May 1993,
Request for Comments (RFC) 1459 established a formal IRC protocol using
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) for reliable end-to-end chat services and optional
Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encryption [OiR93]. The default port for IRC is
6667, however many IRC networks will also accept clients on nearby port numbers such
as 6661-6679. In the IRC architecture, users download an IRC client, install it, and then
connect to centralized servers. Users then join a “channel” which divides users into
groups based on discussion topics and allows them to communicate to the group or to an
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individual via a private message. Table 1 describes the most common commands used in

IRC applications.
Table 1: Common Commands Used by IRC Applications
Command

Function

/help

Get help using IRC

/server

Connect to a server

/join

Join a channel

/leave

Leave a channel

/list

List all the channels on the server

/msg

Send a message to a user or channel

/nick

Change user’s nickname

/quit

Terminate the IRC session

Figure 1 shows how the IRC architecture enables communication between peers
and the server. As shown in the figure, to send a message to a channel the following
occurs:

Figure 1: IRC Client to Client Communication
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1. The client connects to an IRC server and selects a channel to join (red arrow).
2. Client and server exchange information establishing the user’s nickname and the
channel information (green arrow).
3. Client sends a message to be displayed in the channel. This communication is
sent to the server in a “Request” packet (red arrow).
4. Server forwards the packet to all other clients within the same channel as a
“Response” packet. This communication is not sent back to the original sender’s
client by the server (blue arrows).
Due to IRC’s ease of use and ability to instantly communicate with a large
number of people, its use has steadily increased since its introduction. In 1991, IRC was
used to report on the Soviet coup d’état attempt throughout the government-mandated
media blackout [IRC91]. During the Gulf War, IRC gained popularity as an instant
communications medium for late-breaking news updates before news broadcast coverage
[IRC94]. Figure 2 shows the number of IRC users and channels active during a two
week period from the top 10 major IRC networks participating in the survey. The total
number of users fluctuates between 600,000 to 830,000 people.

Figure 2: Users On IRC During a Two Week Period in May, 2010 [Gel10]
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In the US military, applications such as e-mail and chat have proven to be
warfighting enablers by enhancing mission planning with a rapid communication channel
[Eov06]. Text-based chat is used extensively by all military branches and throughout the
Department of Defense. It is used for unit-level tactical coordination as well as broadscale strategic planning and joint operations. Increasingly, IRC-like applications are
becoming a preferred tool for communication between disparate platforms or with
coalition partners.
Eovito [Eov06] notes that the use of chat among joint forces has evolved in an adhoc fashion in an effort to fill gaps in existing command and control (C2) systems, but
has become an essential communications tool favored over more traditional methods.
IRC and similar instant chat applications have several advantages over other traditional
C2 systems:
1. Bandwidth. The bandwidth requirements for text-based chat are far less than for
other data systems.

This is important in bandwidth-constrained tactical

environments.
2. Speed. Chat is faster than other systems due to rapid transmission time of text
and also due to the more rapid turnaround compared to other methods such as
phone calls or radio.

Chat provides for simultaneous transcription and

dissemination in a one-to-many fashion.
3. Ease of use.

Most chat clients have a very small learning curve compared to

other C2 systems, thus requiring less training.
4. Availability. Users typically experience a higher degree of availability with chat
servers compared with other C2 systems. According to [Eov06], users “reported
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that chat was the only form of communication in many cases, where units were
too far for voice, and the available transmission systems lacked the bandwidth for
larger C2 systems.” Additionally, many Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) plans call for chat to be one of the first systems
available when deployed, making it useful as a coordination tool for bringing
other C2 systems online.
5. Efficiency. Tactical users often find that “chat allows them to send more data
with less time and effort” [Eov06]. Also, it is easy to monitor chat while working
with other onscreen tools, maps, etc. Since chat provides a running transcript,
users spend less time having to repeat information that was previously
disseminated. Additionally, because users may participate in multiple chat rooms,
it is easier to target a designated audience.
2.2

Steganography
Within the domain of information hiding, there are two primary methods for

transmitting secret information: encryption and steganography. Encryption is the practice
of obscuring secret data so that it is unintelligible, whereas steganography hides the
existence of the exchanged information within a seemingly harmless message [Cac05].
More precisely, steganography is a method for supplementing encryption to prevent the
existence of data from being detected [Con03].
Steganography is one of the oldest techniques for data hiding. A renowned Greek
historian, Herodotus (485 – 525 BC), describes a story during the war between the
Persian Empire and the Greek city-states where messengers would shave their heads,
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write a message on their scalp, and then wait for the hair to regrow [Sel62]. In this way,
the messenger could travel freely to their destination and transmit the covertly hidden
message.
The classic model for hidden communication was first proposed by Simmons as
the prisoners’ problem [Sim84]. In his model, Alice and Bob have committed a crime
and are kept in separate cells of a prison. They are only allowed to communicate with
each other on paper via a warden named Wendy, with the restriction that they will not
encrypt their messages. If the warden detects any suspicious communications in their
messages then they will both be put into solitary confinement. To plan an escape, Alice
and Bob need to communicate their secrets within the inspected messages in a way that
avoids suspicion, such as through steganography.
Steganography techniques fall under the problem domain where the goal is to hide
as much information as possible, bandwidth, while remaining immune to discovery. This
goal is often referred to as robustness [KaP00]. Figure 3 is a conceptual view of the datahiding problem. The tradeoff between bandwidth and robustness infers that as more data
is hidden, the resulting scheme to do so will be a less secure or robust. On the other
hand, the less data there is to hide, the more secure or robust the scheme will be. Due to
this tradeoff, current steganography techniques define their systems based on how
detectable they are to various methods as well as their throughput capabilities.
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Figure 3: Data-hiding Problem Space [BGM+96]

2.2.1

Terminology

Steganography has a specific lexicon to describe different aspects of the system’s
components and functions.

Outlined below are the terms used in this thesis when

describing the steganographic system. Figure 4 shows a typical steganography system
used to transmit and decode a secret message.
•

Cover. The object being used to hide the secret information; this is often in the
form of pictures [FPK07], audio files [Cve04], videos [NFN+04], or text
documents [Cha97]. Discovery of the cover alone should not arouse suspicion.

•

Secret. The file or message which is covertly hidden within the cover to evade
detection. The secret is recoverable by the receiver.

•

Embedding Process. Method used to conceal a secret within the cover. This
process often includes compression as well as an encryption algorithm. While
compression and encryption are not required to embed a secret, in recent years
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this has become the de facto standard for nearly all steganographic systems
[RaS10].
•

Stego Object. The resulting data from the embedding process.

This object

contains the embedded secret information which should not be easily
discoverable.
•

Extraction Process. Method used to recover the secret from the stego object.
The cover is usually discarded in this process.

•

Stego Key. The secret key used to encrypt/decrypt the secret information in the
embedding process. This key is usually shared between sender and receiver outof-band from the stego object method of transmission.

Figure 4: A Keyed Steganography System
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2.2.2

Encrypted Steganographic Systems

Steganographic systems can be divided into three categories based on the
encryption scheme used in the embedding process [KCC+07]. Pure Steganography is the
weakest and least robust approach because it does not use any encryption; instead it relies
on the assumption that parties other than the sender and intended receiver are unaware of
the exchange of secret information.
Public Key Steganography (PKS) uses an asymmetric key algorithm to establish
public and private keys to encrypt the secret information. In this scheme, the sender
encrypts the secret with their public key which can only be decrypted with the
corresponding private key from the intended receiver. This is the most robust approach
but has the disadvantage of having the highest computational overhead as well as key
management complexity. Properly exchanging keys is one of the major challenges for
any keyed encryption technique [KaP00].
In Secret Key Steganography (SKS), also called symmetric key steganography,
both the sender and receiver share or have agreed on a common set of stego keys prior to
sending the stego object. The advantages of this approach includes the simplicity of key
management as well as the difficulty for an adversary to conduct a brute force attack
which would require excessive amount of computational power, time, and determination.
2.2.3

Text-Based Steganography

Within the last decade, steganography techniques have largely focused on hiding
information within images because they provide significant pixel redundancy and are
frequently transmitted over the Internet. However, images are not ideal when attempting
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to exfiltrate large amounts of data for two reasons. For a technique that focuses on
concealing as much information as possible, the image file grows proportionally to the
amount of information being stored. Exceptionally large images are more likely to be
noticed by network administrators. Additionally, the increase in hidden information
potentially distorts the image itself, providing a clue to its hidden contents. On the other
hand, if the approach focuses on robustness (i.e., keeping the size of the image intact)
then only a few bits of information can be encoded per image.
Text data is still the largest bulk of digital data used and exchanged daily, spurred
by the rise of information dissemination media such as email, blogs, and text messaging
[KaP00]. The preponderance of this text media creates an attractive venue for covert
communication channels and has emerged as a solution for transmitting information
efficiently and securely.
Hiding data in text is an exercise in modifying the cover text so that the changes
go unnoticed to readers. Various text steganography techniques were used during World
War I and II to conceal messages from the enemy in case of interception. In World War
I, the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. sent the following telegram messages to its
Berlin headquarters [Sta05]:
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By concatenating the first character of every word in the first message and the
second character of every word in the second message, the following concealed secret is
retrieved [Sta05]:

During World War II, invisible ink was used to write information on paper so that
the paper appeared to be blank to the average person. To make the message viewable,
liquids such as milk, vinegar, fruit juices or urine were used because, when heated, they
darken and become visible to the human eye.
Text steganography techniques can be classified into two categories: linguistic or
technical [Con03] [RaS10].

Linguistic, or Natural Language (NL), steganography

manipulates the cover-text’s lexical, syntactic, or semantic properties while preserving
the meaning as much as possible to embed secret information, such as through synonym
substitution [TTA06] [ShS08] [Bol04].

Technical-based methods use physical text

formatting as a way to hide information, such as through the insertion of extra spaces
[Kwa06], deliberate misspellings [TTA07] [Sha08], or resizing of the fonts throughout
the text [RaS10].
Brassil et al. describe several text-based steganography methods which enable
positive identification of copyright infringed documents [BLM+95] [BLM+99]. These
techniques can also be used to transmit hidden messages. Line-shift coding is a way of
altering a document by vertically shifting the locations of text lines to uniquely encode
the document. Word-shift coding alters a document by horizontally shifting the locations
of words within text lines.
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Character coding, or feature specific coding, is a technique that is applied only on
the bitmap image of the document and could be examined for chosen character features.
Those features are altered or not altered depending on the codeword. For example, in
Figure 5 the letter “r” in the word “Internet” is shifted down by 1/600 inch. The second
line reveals the displacement more clearly by reprinting the word in a larger font size. A
document marked in such an indiscernible way could be used to identify the copyright
owner. If a document copy is suspected to have been illicitly disseminated, that copy
could be decoded and the copyright owner identified.

Figure 5: Example of character coding [BLM+99]

2.2.4

Whitespace Steganography

Whitespace steganography manipulates or inserts spaces (ASCII character 32),
tabs (ASCII 9) and line feeds (ASCII 10). Because these characters are invisible to the
casual observer, it is often advantageous to utilize them for covert communication. In
general, whitespace encoding methods can be useful as long as the text remains in an
ASCII format.
Bender, Gruhl, Morimoto, and Lu discuss a number of steganographic techniques
for hiding data in cover text [BGM+96]. Figure 6 shows one of their techniques which
places one extra whitespace after a line to conceal a secret ‘0’ or two extra whitespaces to
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conceal a secret ‘1’ bit. This approach has the advantage that extra whitespaces at the
end of lines typically go unnoticed to readers. While robust to interception, this approach
has the disadvantage of not being ideal for transmitting large amounts of secret
information because of the low encoding throughput, transmitting only one bit per line.

Figure 6: Whitespace encoded text [BGM+96]
Another technique discussed by [BGM+96] uses whitespaces throughout a
justified cover text to encode a bit pattern, as shown in Figure 7. Data is encoded by
controlling where extra spaces are placed. One space between words is interpreted as a
‘0’, and two spaces are interpreted as a ‘1’. This method results in higher throughput
than the previous approach, able to encode several bits per line, however because this
approach is limited to justified text documents, its usage is somewhat more limited.

Figure 7: Data hidden through whitespace with justification [BGM+96]

WhiteSteg is a tool which uses a hybrid approach for whitespace encoding using
both the spaces between words and between paragraphs [PAD08].

WhiteSteg

dynamically generates cover-text using nursery rhymes according to the length of the
secret message, up to 512 bytes. The chorus of rhymes is center-aligned because extra
spacing is easier to hide in this configuration. This approach uses the better of two
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different whitespace padding techniques but it cannot encode messages larger than 512
bytes.
Snow is an open-source whitespace steganographic program created by Kwan that
is used to conceal messages or files in ASCII text by appending whitespaces and tabs to
the ends of lines [Kwa06]. Since trailing spaces and tabs occasionally occur naturally in
text, their existence should not raise suspicions to alert observers who stumble across
them. Additionally, Snow embeds multiple bits per line depending on the cover traffic,
which enables higher throughput than similar whitespace encoding techniques. The
details of this algorithm are described in Chapter 4.
2.3

Covert Timing Channels
A covert channel is a communication medium, unintended by the system

designer, that an attacker can use to transmit hidden messages from an entity in a higher
security zone to an entity in a lower security zone [Kem83].
The difficulty of detecting or eliminating timing channels makes them a desirable
choice for adversaries that value stealth over throughput. In particular, attackers may
attempt to leak data over a network, through manipulating legitimate network streams to
move sensitive information without detection.
Timing channels herein are assumed to be within a network environment. From
this point forward, any reference to a covert timing channel (CTC), unless otherwise
stated, will be channels that operate within a network. In general, CTCs modulate the
time period between two consecutive packets in a network stream to encode a symbol.
The time between consecutive packets is referred to as the inter-packet delay (IPD).
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Since the IPD is the only part of the stream that is modified, CTCs are effective
regardless of the actual packet payload, even if it is encrypted. However, this also means
that at least two packets must be sent for each symbol. As such, the capacity of a CTC is
significantly lower than standard communication protocols such as File Transfer Protocol
(FTP).
The node that encodes the message into the target network stream is referred to as
the sender, and the node that decodes the message is the receiver. For the transmission of
the message to be successful the receiver must be positioned so that it is able to observe
the IPDs of the stream at some point during its transit through the network. The receiver
must also have a means to identify which stream contains the covert channel. It is
important to note that the receiver is not necessarily the final destination of the stream; it
could be positioned between the sender and an intended recipient.
Since the CTC is may be moving data from a higher security zone to a lower
security zone, it is logical to assume that only simplex communication is available due to
firewalls or the inability of the receiver to modify the stream. This provides the worst
case scenario as the receiver cannot communicate directly with the sender. As a result,
synchronization and error correction become more critical since the receiver cannot
inform the sender of its current status.
2.3.1

Examples of Covert Timing Channels

Covert timing channels are either passive or active [GiW07]. Passive CTCs only
modify the IPDs of existing network streams to encode the message, i.e., they do not
generate any additional traffic. Conversely, active channels generate new traffic with
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IPDs that match the symbols of the message. Intuitively, passive channels are harder to
detect since they use legitimate streams and can thus evade intrusion detection systems
and monitoring; however, they are also dependent on a process that the attacker may not
control.

This means they sacrifice capacity in exchange for increased detection

resistance. Examples of both active and passive CTCs are given below.
2.3.1.1 IP Covert Timing Channel
The IP Covert Timing Channel, an active CTC developed by Cabuk et al.
[CBS09], maps an arbitrary number of symbols to specific IPD values. This interval is
known by both the sender and receiver. The specific choice of timing interval must
balance channel capacity with the frequency of bit errors. If the interval is too small,
network jitter could cause bits to be flipped, corrupting the message. Conversely, if the
interval is too large, the capacity of the channel may be too small to be considered
practical.
In the simple case of a binary scheme, a distinct IPD value is assigned to represent
0 and 1 bits, denoted as IPD0 and IPD1 respectively. In order to transmit a 1 bit, the
sender transmits a packet such that the inter-packet delay between the current and
previous packets will be equal to IPD1. A similar process is used to encode a 0 bit.
Since only two different values are used to encode the bits, the timing IP CTC is easy to
detect.
2.3.1.2 Model Based Covert Timing Channel
Gianvecchio et al. [GWW+08] proposed a framework for an active CTC that
mimics the statistical properties of legitimate network streams, referred to as the model-
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based CTC (MBCTC). The framework creates a model of legitimate traffic, which in
turn helps determine the properties of the CTC.
To construct the CTC, the system first analyzes the target traffic type and finds
the best fit for the IPD distribution. The secret is split into symbols that map to IPDs
based on the inverse distribution function of the best fitting distribution. Finally, packets
are sent using the calculated IPDs.

Decoding is performed using the cumulative

distribution function. The distribution can be changed over time to reflect any changes in
the target traffic.
2.3.1.3 Jitterbug Covert Timing Channel
Jitterbug is a passive CTC that uses a hardware device [SMB06]. This device
exploits a network-based timing channel to transmit a hidden message and is designed to
transmit passwords and secret information over interactive network applications (e.g.,
SSH, X-windows). JitterBug is a keylogger and resides between the keyboard and the
CPU. In interactive network applications, every keystroke generates a packet and by
modifying the keystroke timing carefully, JitterBug encodes the message.
A timing window, w, determines the additional delay required to encode a
message bit. A one bit is encoded by increasing inter-packet delay to a value modulo w
milliseconds, a zero bit is encoded by increasing inter-packet delay by modulo



 


milliseconds. The timing window w should be large enough to avoid errors induced by
network jitter. Experimentally, Jitterbug achieves reliable communication with window
sizes ranging from 2 to 20 milliseconds, depending on network delays.
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2.3.1.4 Liquid Covert Timing Channel
Walls and Wright proposed a passive CTC that uses a portion of the compromised
stream to smooth out the distortion that can be recognized by shape detection tests, called
Liquid [WrW09]. Liquid uses half of the IPDs to encode the hidden message and the
other half of the IPDs to increase detection resistance via entropy tests. In the entropy
test, each IPD is mapped to one of M symbols, which are histograms of IPDs of
legitimate traffic. Liquid keeps track of the mapped symbols during message encoding
and generates other symbols based on prior history. Thus, the probability of a symbol
being transmitted is nearly equal, increasing the entropy value.
2.3.2

Defense Against Covert Channels

Techniques to defend against covert timing channels can be categorized as either
prevention or detection techniques. Prevention either eliminates the possibility of a
channel or reduces the capacity to such a degree that using the channel is impractical.
Detection techniques, on the other hand, attempt to identify active covert channels.
Kemmerer proposed the use of a Shared Resource Matrix to identify resources
and entities that could be used as covert channels [Kem83] [Kem02]. This matrix is used
at design time to assist system architects when creating multilevel secure systems.
Adding noise to system clocks can reduce the capacity of a timing channel [Hu91]. A
more aggressive prevention technique called the Pump is placed between two processes
so that communications are intercepted and sent through a randomization scheme to
perturb timing information [KaM93] [KMC05].

24

Active Warden removes storage channels from objects that have strict format
definitions which allow the content of the objects to be objectively verified [FFP+03]. A
practical example of such an object would be the packet header definition of a network
protocol. Similar to Pump, Active Warden intercepts each of these objects as they are
being transmitted.

Before being forwarded to their destination, the Warden applies

specific rules that may alter packet data to make the object’s content more consistent.
For example, a rule may specify that an unused header field must contain all zeros.
When applying this rule, the Warden would zero all of the bits in that field.
Burke et al. [BGC05] investigated a simple statistical method for detecting covert
timing channels when the legitimate network stream IPD’s roughly fit a normal
distribution. A histogram of IPDs composed of equal size bins is created and the shape
of the histogram is compared to a desired network stream. The presence of a bimodal or
multimodal distribution would suggest the existence of a covert timing channel. Using
this method, the probability that a stream contains a covert channel is




 

µ
1

 

(1)

where Cµ is the count of the bin with the mean delay, and Cmax is the count of the largest
bin.
2.3.2.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test has also been used to determine if the
distribution of a sample set of IPDs matched that of a legitimate set of IPDs [GiW07]. A
difference in the distributions suggests the presence of a CTC in the sample. The KS test
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is a non-parametric test that determines if two samples are from the same distribution.
One major advantage of this test is that it does not rely on any assumptions in regards to
the actual distribution of the samples. The KS test statistic measures the maximum
distance between two empirical distribution functions (or a sample and a distribution)
   max|! "#$   "#$|

(2)

where S1 and S2 are the empirical distribution functions of two samples. Since the KS
test directly compares the empirical distribution functions, the samples do not need to be
the same size. The KS test is useful for covert channel methods designed to avoid shapebased detection.
2.3.2.2 Regularity Test
A regularity test detects CTCs based on the variance of the IPDs is relatively
constant [CBS04]. For most network traffic the variance of the IPDs changes over time,
whereas with covert timing channels, if the encoding scheme does not change over time,
the variance of the IPDs remains relatively constant. A sample is separated into sets of w
inter-packet delays. Then for each w the standard deviation σi of the set is computed.
The regularity is the standard deviation of the pair wise differences between each σi and
σj for all sets i<j or
1σ2  σ3 1
%&'()*%+,-  ./ 0
4 , + 6 7, 8+, 7
σ2

where σi is the standard deviation of the ith window.

(3)

A large difference from an

established norm for legitimate traffic suggests the use of a CTC since similar traffic is
expected to cluster around similar timing intervals. Covert timing channels using static
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IPDs, such as IPD0 = 0 and IPD1 = 1, is easily detected with this method because the IPD
variances will remain relatively constant over time, resulting in a low regularity value.
Regularity is a widely accepted metric for detecting covert channels [CBS09] [GiW07]
[GWW+08] [WrW09], and differs significantly from the KS test.
2.4

RC4 Encryption
Encryption in VANISH further obfuscates the hidden text so that even if the

covert communication is discovered and analyzed, it is difficult to decipher. RC4 is
chosen due to its simplicity, speed, and cryptographic strength.
RC4 was designed by Ron Rivest of RSA Security in 1987 [RSA10]. It uses a
symmetric key stream-cipher algorithm which requires a secure exchange of a shared key
which the algorithm does not provide. The key exchange is typically assumed to be
securely swapped out-of-band from the IRC communication channel. A stream cipher is
one of the simplest methods of encrypting data; each byte is sequentially encrypted using
one byte of the key. Stream ciphers are ideal for this application because they produce
variable length ciphertext which can be matched to any size plaintext message. Since its
inception, RC4 has become one of the most widely used encryption standards. In fact, it
is used to encrypt Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
optionally, Transport Layer Security (TLS), BitTorrent protocol, Oracle SQL, Remote
Desktop Protocol, and PDF documents.
The RC4 algorithm, shown in Figure 8, works in three phases: initialization, Key
Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA)
[Enc07]. During the initialization phase, an array containing 256 elements is generated
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with unique byte codes in each element. The initialized array is run through the KSA
which uses the secret key to scramble each element of the array. The 256-element array
is then fed to the PRGA to further scramble the ar
array
ray and generate the keystream. An

Exclusive OR (XOR) operation between the keystream and the plaintext, byte by byte, is
performed to produce the ciphertext.

Figure 8: RC4 Encryption Algorithm

Decryption in RC4 is a straightforward process. Since the keystream generated
by the algorithm is only dependent on the secret key, the receiver only has to know what
key was used along with the ciphertext to recover the plaintext. An XOR operation is

performed on the ciphertext with the generated keystream byte by byte to produce the
original plaintext message. The logic for the decipher is

28

"9 #:% ;$ #:% ;  9

(4)

where A is the original secret message and B is the keystream produced by the RC4
algorithm.
2.5

Summary
This chapter presents background information on IRC and its networking

protocol. Current usage trends among the top 10 IRC servers are discussed as well as its
use and benefits to the military. Steganography is discussed along with current research
in the area of text-based steganography. Next, covert timing channels are explored
detailing several of the latest research efforts in this field. The details of two covert
timing channel detection mechanisms are explained, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
regularity tests. Finally, the chapter concludes with a background on the RC4 encryption
scheme.
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III.

T

Methodology

his chapter presents the methodology to evaluate the performance of the VANISH
system. Section 3.1 addresses the problem definition, goals, hypotheses, and

approach. The System Boundaries and System Under Test (SUT) are defined in Section
3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the system services including their outcome, followed by a
detailed description of the workload in Section 3.4.

The performance metrics are

presented in Section 3.5, system parameters in Section 3.6, and the factors involved are
discussed in Section 3.7. A detailed explanation of the evaluation technique follows in
Section 3.8. Section 3.9 addresses the experimental design for this research. Finally, the
chapter is summarized in Section 3.10.
3.1

Problem Definition
The problem considered herein supposes an experienced enemy has gained

control of a machine with intent to exfiltrate its files. Network probing determines that
IRC traffic is enabled on the machine’s firewall, so the adversary uses this vulnerability
to covertly transmit the machine’s files. Through social engineering or other means, the
adversary learns the IRC server/channel which the machine usually connects to. The
problem then is to engineer the traffic to appear legitimate to channel observers.
Depending on the adversary’s needs, the file extraction goal could be to transmit the files
as quickly as possible or to use a more stealthy approach to minimize suspicion and
detection.
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3.1.1

Goals and Hypothesis

The objective of this research is to develop and evaluate new information hiding
techniques.

Specifically, the proposed system uses either steganographic or CTC

encoding methods to exfiltrate data with either high capacity or high detection resistance,
depending on the user’s requirements. Two covert data exfiltration techniques over IRC
are designed and analyzed against a common baseline.
The goals of this research are to:
•

Construct an IRC steganographic system using the software algorithm from Snow
[Kwa06], a high-throughput steganographic tool for whitespace encoding. This
system is hereafter referred to as the Baseline scenario.

•

Develop and optimize a steganographic system which maximizes the throughput
capacity per message while remaining sufficiently undetectable in the channel,
hereafter referred to as the Throughput scenario.

•

Develop and optimize a covert timing channel system which maximizes detection
resistance by modeling and blending in with legitimate network traffic by
manipulating inter-packet delays, hereafter referred to as the Stealth scenario.
The three encoding techniques under test do not exhaust all possible information

hiding capabilities over IRC. Rather, they show a range of capabilities by exploiting the
IRC protocol in different ways while maximizing either throughput or stealth against a
common baseline.
It is hypothesized that the Throughput scenario can approach the theoretical limits
for transferring covert information over IRC by transmitting as much secret data as
possible per message, as well as transmitting the messages as fast as possible within
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server limitations. It is also hypothesized that the Stealth encoding algorithm can evade
shape and regularity detection measures to within a 95
95%
% confidence interval by
emulating legitimate traffic distributions.

3.1.2

Approach

The VANISH system is the framework for testing the Baseline, Throughput, and
Stealth encoding techniques. As shown in Figure 9, the framework is a pipeline structure
with three modules: encryption, encoding, and transmission. Encryption of the secret file
adds a second layer of security to the covert messages so even if the covert traffic was
detected and captured, it is difficult for the attacker to determine its contents without
knowing the key. After encryption, the file passes to one of three modules which
covertly encode the secret: Baseline, Throughput, or Stealth. The encoded file is sent to
the transmitter module which connects to an IRC server and transmitting the encoded

secret.

Figure 9: Framework to design VANISH sender

Once the IRC server receives the message, it is transmitted to all clients in the

channel where the receiver awaits. The decoding process is performed on the receiving
client with three modules: receiver, decoder, and decryption
decryption,, as shown in Figure 10. The
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receiver module connects to the IRC server and forwards all encoded messages from the
sender client to the selectable decoder module. The sender and receiver are assumed to
have agreed on an encoding technique prior to the transmission. The encoded messages
are sent through the decoding process to produce the encrypted file which is decrypted
using the same key to recover the secret file.

Figure 10: Framework to design VANISH receiver

VANISH is developed in the C as a user-space process which provides a platform
independent solution benefitting from a strong heritage of simplicity and speed. The C
language also allows for relatively simple file and socket API manipulation. The encoder

module uses random number generation and random variable models from the GNU
Scientific Library (GSL) [GNU10].
In this design, there is a unidirectional communication model for the covert data
transfer. Note that only the covert communication is assumed to be unidirectional; IRC
itself is bidirectional as all TCP/IP packets are acknowledged. A unidirectional covert
channel means the receiver cannot communicate directly with the sender which increases
the difficulty in achieving an error-free transfer.
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In particular, the receiver cannot

acknowledge the correct receipt of covert packets, rate limit the sender, or indicate when
to resynchronize. These challenges, as well as those imposed by the IRC server (such as
traffic throttling and enforced maximum packet size), create a complex network of design

variables for the covert communication system.
Figure 11 shows the experimental methodology and tests which are elaborated in
the following sections. For the purposes of evaluating throughput and detectability, the
cover traffic is not crucial to the experiments. In practice however, the cover should be
germane to the channel so it does not raise suspicion.

Figure 11: Experiments and Tests for Research Methodology
3.1.2.1 Experiment #1: Determine IRC Hidden Characters
The first experiment uses a modified whitespace encoding algorithm from the

steganographic tool Snow [Kwa06] to transmit hidden messages over an IRC channel.
Snow uses whitespaces and tab characters to hide messages at the ends of lines in text
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documents. However, in a preliminary study, tab characters are found to be viewable in
IRC clients; therefore, an analysis of all ASCII characters is conducted to find a suitable
replacement hidden character. To demonstrate wide-spread applicability, the two most
popular IRC client applications for Windows and Linux OS, mIRC and Xchat, are tested
to identify shared non-viewable characters. The results of this experiment and details of
the Baseline algorithm are discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1.2.2 Experiment #2: Maximize IRC Capacity Limits
For the Throughput scenario, a fictional adversary intends to exfiltrate the greatest
amount of information, capacity, over IRC with little regard to detectability. Maximizing
capacity requires sending the most information per packet as well as per time. An
analysis of the server throttling limitations is conducted to determine the maximum speed
messages can be sent to the channel. Shared non-viewable ASCII characters found from
Experiment #1 are used to encode covert data. The results of this experiment and details
of the Throughput algorithm are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
3.1.2.3 Experiment #3: Identify Legitimate IRC Traffic Distribution
The Stealth scenario exploits the underlying network protocols of IRC to covertly
transmit data based on the timing of messages sent and received.

This approach

sacrifices data rate to improve detection resistance by manipulating traffic timing patterns
so they are statistically indistinguishable from normal traffic.

To determine the

distribution of legitimate IRC traffic, chat logs of observed IRC channels are captured
and examined for best fit analysis. The distribution of the legitimate network traffic is
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modeled by the Stealth encoding algorithm as it transmits covert data. The details of this
experiment and the Stealth algorithm are discussed in Chapter 4.
3.2

System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the VANISH System. A block diagram is

shown in Figure 12. It consists of the following components: the encoding technique,
encryption software, the computer which the experiments are run on, and the attached

Ethernet network. This research uses an Ethernet network, but the techniques are equally
applicable to other networks, such as 802.11. The Component Under Test (CUT) is the
encoding technique which hides the covert message. The CUT is designed and optimized

for each technique to compare system responses.

Figure 12: The VANISH System

Workload parameters include the secret file to encode, the IRC cover traffic, and

the encryption key. The workload parameters are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.
The system parameters consist of the cover traffi
trafficc frequency in the channel, the IRC
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client application in use, and the latency between the sender and receiver clients via the
IRC server. These parameters are discussed in more detail in Section 3.6. The desired
system responses are characterized by the throughput in capacity per packet (CPP) and
capacity per second (CPS), detectability using the shape and regularity tests, and bit error
rate (BER) as a percentage of errors versus the total number of covert messages
transmitted. The performance metric details are discussed in Section 3.5.
3.3

System Services
This system provides a covert communication service using steganographic or

covert timing channel techniques over the IRC protocol. The service is successful when
a secret is encrypted, encoded and transmitted to a designated IRC channel such that it is
undetectable by the client application software. The intended receiver must correctly
capture, decode, and decrypt the secret to extract the original message. The service fails
when the secret cannot be properly encoded, the encoded message is viewable in the
channel, or when the intended recipient cannot recover the secret message.
3.4

Workload
The workload of the SUT consists of three parts: the secret file to transmit, the

cover traffic, and the encryption key. The secret file workload is defined by its file size
and file type. The amount of cover traffic needed to disguise the data transfer is directly
proportional to the secret’s file size. The secret file type, on the other hand, has a lesser
effect on performance because the encoder treats all file contents as bits. The content of
the cover traffic is also very important to the success of the system. Since the motivation
for this research is to identify methods for covertly communicating over public IRC
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channels, the cover traffic must not be unusual or arouse suspicion for the given channel,
i.e., it should be consistent with existing traffic. For example, users in a channel created
for physics discussions may find it unusual if messages regarding home cooking were
sent. The encryption key exchange between sender and receiver is assumed to take place
securely and out-of-band from the IRC communication channel.
3.5

Performance Metrics
Performance metrics establish the impact of the experimental scenarios.

Information hiding techniques generally focus on concealing as much information as
discretely and accurately as possible. Therefore, three types of performance metrics are
collected for this SUT to determine detectability, throughput, and bit error rate (BER).
Two metrics for throughput are collected for each encoding method: CPP and
CPS. Capacity is the amount of covert information in the secret file in bits. Therefore,
CPP is a function of the size of the secret file and amount of covert information
embedded per packet, while CPS is dependent on the size of the secret file and the rate at
which the covert packets are transmitted to the IRC server. Reliability of the VANISH
system is measured by its bit error rate: the number of bit errors from the covert file
transfer as measured by the receiver after forward error correction.
For the encoding methods described in this thesis to be effective, their covert
traffic must be non-viewable to observers in the public IRC channel. However, deeppacket network inspection or other analysis techniques may successfully identify the
covert channel, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. The detection metrics employed in this
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thesis are commonly used to identify covert timing channels.

These include the

Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for shape and the regularity test for variance.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is run 100 times for each experimental test against
randomly generated distributions which use the best-fit parameters from legitimate traffic
samples. Each test produces a p-value as a measure of the significance of the null
hypothesis that both distributions are different. The higher the p-value, the better the
generated covert traffic fits the distribution of the observed traffic. The mean IPD,
standard deviation, standard error of the mean, and confidence interval of each test are
reported.
In previous research [CBS04] [GiW07], low regularity was used as an indicator of
a CTC. Therefore, the regularity of the legitimate traffic sample herein is tested and
compared with the covert traffic for each encoding method with window size w = 25.
The covert traffic for each method is deemed to pass the regularity test if its score is
within 10% of the legitimate traffic’s regularity score.
3.6

Parameters
The parameters of the system are the properties which, when changed, impacts the

performance of the system.

These include both system parameters and workload

parameters. The workload and system parameters for the SUT are described below.
3.6.1

Workload Parameters

The workload of the SUT consists of the secret file to transmit over the channel,
the encryption key, and the IRC cover traffic which will conceal the presence of the
hidden data.
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•

Secret File: This research uses three 3 kilobyte randomly generated files as the
secrets for experiments. A randomly generated file has the advantage of not
making any assumptions on the formatting of a particular file and therefore is not
file type dependent. The system is also not dependent on the file size, however
larger size files require more cover traffic. A 3 kilobyte file is chosen because it
is large enough to accurately measure capacity, detectability, and bit error rate for
each of the encoding scenarios without requiring excessive redundant effort.

•

IRC Cover Traffic: This is the representative cover traffic germane to the public
IRC channel the covert communication will take place over. The length, in
number of messages sent to the IRC channel, is dependent on the size of the secret
being transmitted and the covert encoding method selected. Higher throughput
methods require less cover traffic to transmit the secret. In preliminary tests, a 3
kilobyte secret file requires 1289 messages with the Baseline method, 30
messages with the Throughput method, and 27,648 messages with the Stealth
method. When there are no more secret bits to transmit, the cover traffic will
cease.

•

Encryption Key: The encryption key is supplied to the system prior to encoding.
To successfully decrypt the secret file, the receiver must use the same key used
during encryption. The key used in the experiments is “thesis”.
3.6.2

System Parameters

System parameters that affect the performance of the SUT include:
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•

Cover Traffic Frequency: The frequency of cover traffic has a direct impact on
the amount of secret messages sent. Each encoding technique uses different
transmission frequencies to achieve their respective objectives of throughput or
detection resistance. The Baseline and Throughput transmission frequency is one
second per packet while the Stealth method transmits at approximately four
seconds per packet. The details of these methods are discussed in Chapter 4.

•

IRC Client Application: The top two IRC client applications for Windows and
Linux, mIRC and Xchat, respectively, are tested for in-channel detection and
cross-platform reliability.

•

Client-Server-Client Latency: The distance between the sender, IRC server, and
recipient may affect the reliability (BER) of the CTC encoding. As such, two
different wide area networks (WAN) are tested for each encoding method. The
first scenario, referred to as WAN-US, uses a public IRC server in Chicago,
Illinois (66.225.225.225) and a transmitter/receiver located in Dayton, OH. The
second WAN connection, WAN-EU, is between a public IRC server located in
Amsterdam, Netherlands (194.109.129.220) and a transmitter/receiver are located
in Dayton, Ohio. Table 2 shows the test network scenarios physical distance
(round-trip) and average round trip time (RTT). Because ping and traceroute
requests are routinely dropped by IRC servers, RTT, measured in milliseconds, is
determined by transmitting/receiving on the same machine and averaging packet
timing differences over 100 samples.
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Table 2: Test Network Scenarios

3.7

Test
Network

WAN-US

WAN-EU

Distance
RTT

600 miles
16.458 ms

8,162 miles
90.236 ms

Factors
Factors provide insight into the impact of the different encoding techniques

without requiring excessive or redundant effort. Table 3 shows the factors used and their
associated levels for the experiments. The factors include the three CUT encoding
techniques, three randomly generated 3 KB secret files, and the test network scenario.

Factor
Encoding
Configuration

Table 3: Factor Levels
Level 1
Level 2
Baseline
Throughput
Encoding
Encoding

Random 3 KB
Secret File

File #1

File #2

Test Network
Scenario

WAN-US

WAN-EU

Level 3
Stealth
Encoding
File #3

The encoding technique is designated as the Component Under Test. It controls
all aspects of the system relating to covert throughput and the detectability of the covert
communication. The encoding configuration has three levels: Baseline, Throughput, and
Stealth encoding. The Baseline encoding technique is used as a reference point to
compare the other encoding algorithms against. Throughput and Stealth encoding will
show a range of capabilities maximizing either throughput or detection resistance. Three
randomly generated 3 KB files test whether the encoder functions independently from the
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secret file contents. The two network scenarios specified will determine the transmission
reliability of the encoding techniques.
3.8

Evaluation Technique
Direct measurement is the evaluation technique used in this research. More

accurate results can be obtained using actual servers rather than a simulator or analytic
model. Simulation is not practical due to the overhead of creating a virtual computer and
network environment. In addition, servers often respond differently in simulation due to
network latencies. Thus, direct measurement is the most accurate way for analyzing
performance in throughput, reliability, and detectability to evaluate the systems.
The VANISH system generates covert messages and transmits them to the IRC
server where it propagates to the users in the channel. Wireshark, a network sniffer, is
installed on the transmitting and receiving IRC client computers. Wireshark captures
validate that the system operates properly. Detectability with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
and regularity tests is determined offline through statistical analysis of the captured
Wireshark network traffic using R [Rpr10]. Throughput and BER is evaluated using
Wireshark captures of the transmission to obtain accurate time stamps and the received
covert file. CPP is determined by taking the file size divided by the number of IRC
messages required to send the file. CPS is determined by taking the file size divided by
the time required to send the file.
Experiments use two computers running Windows XP Service Pack 2 in the
configuration shown in Figure 13. Each client connects to the test IRC server through
their network router and the internet.
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Figure 13: Experimental Configuration

The computer specifications for the transmitting and receiving clients:

3.9

•

Hewlett-Packard C8510P Laptop

•

Intel Core 2 Duo CPU TT700 @ 2.40 GHz

•

2 GB RAM

•

Intel 82566 Gigabit Network

•

120 GB SATA Hard Drive

•

Wireshark Packet Sniffer
Experimental Design

This experiment uses a full factorial design. Given the factors listed in Section
3.7, 18 trials are required to collect data for given combination of factors:
3 encoding techniques * 3 Secret Files * 2 network scenarios = 18 trials
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Preliminary experiments show that network latency results in some variance in
IRC server responses when forwarding messages. Therefore, three repetitions are used to
characterize that variance and a confidence level of 95% is used. Thus, 54 experimental
trials are needed to execute all cases.
3.10

Summary
This chapter introduces the methodology to accomplish the goals of this research.

The design of the experiment is discussed in detail including the metrics, factors,
parameters, and evaluation technique. Three unique information hiding techniques over
IRC are evaluated by direct measurement based on throughput, detection resistance, and
bit error rate. A full factorial experiment defines 18 trials to collect the metrics using the
following factors: encoding technique, file type, file size, and network scenario. Each
experiment is run three times.
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IV.

T

Software Architecture and Design

his chapter presents the pilot studies, experiments, and details of the VANISH
system algorithms. Since many of the covert techniques are unique to this thesis,

it is appropriate to describe the underlying software and algorithms in detail. Section 4.1
discusses an experiment to find platform independent ASCII characters not visible over
IRC for use in the Baseline and Throughput algorithms. Section 4.2 describes the details
of the Baseline encoding algorithm, followed by an experiment maximizing channel
capacity and particulars of the Throughput algorithm in Section 4.3.

Section 4.4

describes the third experiment which analyzes legitimate IRC traffic IPDs for best-fitting
distribution parameters. The section continues with the details of the Stealth encoding
algorithm using these parameters. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 4.5.
4.1

Baseline Encoding Algorithm
This section describes the experiment, pilot study, and results used to construct

the Baseline encoding method which uses non-viewable ASCII characters to relay
messages over IRC in Section 4.1.1. The details of the Baseline algorithm are presented
in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1

Experiment #1: Determine IRC Hidden Characters

There are two goals of this experiment: 1) to find which ASCII characters are not
viewable in IRC client applications, and 2) to measure their effect on viewable
characters. Because most users read chat messages over their IRC client, any nonviewable characters are effectively hidden.
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In a pilot study, the choice of an IRC client made a difference in which characters
are viewable in the channel. Due to the large number of IRC clients available, both
standard and highly customizable, the experiment is performed using the two most
widely used IRC applications for Windows and Linux OS: mIRC and Xchat [RAD+10].
ASCII characters 0x00h – 0xFFh are sent to an IRC channel via socket programming
where clients using mIRC and Xchat determine channel detectability. For reference, a
complete ASCII table is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14: ASCII Table Reference
Measuring the effect of non-viewable characters on viewable ones is of primary
importance for the steganographic encoding methods. If certain non-viewable characters
make obvious and repeated changes to the cover traffic messages, then its perturbations
could alert channel observers over time. To measure this effect, a control character,
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ASCII ‘0’ (0x30h), is used both before and in-between ASCII test characters in the
configuration 0xx0x, where 0 is the control character and x is the test ASCII character.
Ideal characters identified in this experiment would only show the presence of the control
characters in the IRC message (i.e., 00).
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 4. A total of eight ASCII
characters are non-viewable in mIRC and seven in Xchat. Three categories of covert
characters are identified: whitespace, end of line, and flexible characters. Whitespace
characters produce extra whitespace in the channel but are non-viewable when used at the
ends of a line. End of line characters mask viewable characters that are used after them.
Flexible characters do not affect the control and can be used anywhere in the message.
Table 4: Hidden Character Categories

IRC Client Whitespace
Software Characters

End of Line
Characters

Flexible
Characters
0x02h, 0x0Fh,
0x16h, 0x1Fh,
0xA0h
0x07h, 0x0Fh,
0x16h, 0x1Fh

mIRC

0x20h

0x03h, 0x1Bh

Xchat

0x20h, 0x09h

0x03h

The differences between the three hidden character categories are shown in Figure
15, which displays three screenshots of IRC channel messages when a character from
each category is transmitted: 0x20h, 0x03h, and 0x02h. In the left image, two whitespace
characters offset the spacing between the control characters showing a viewable
disturbance. The middle image shows the effect of the end of line characters, the second
control ‘0’ character is hidden after the 0x03h characters are used. The image on the
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right displays the results of flexible characters which perfectly mask their presence in
IRC channel traffic without offsetting the control characters.

Figure 15: Hidden Character Output, Test Characters 0x20h, 0x03h, and 0x02h

Whitespace characters can be used for covert communication over IRC, however
there are two channel detectability issues. One, the whitespaces must be used at the end
of the cover traffic to remain hidden to avoid excessi
excessively
vely perturbing cover traffic. Two,

the extra whitespace should not cause the message to wrap around to a new text line. For
the Baseline encoding algorithm, these issues are accounted for to adhere to the Snow
steganographic algorithm.
To ensure a cross-platform compatible solution, only characters which are nonviewable in both Xchat and mIRC are used in the steganographic encoding algorithms:
0x20h, 0x03h, 0x0Fh, 0x16h, and 0x1Fh. One limitation for all covert techniques that
use non-viewable ASCII characters is that it is an easy way for a defender to detect and
block these messages from traversing their network through simple intrusion detection
rules filtering packets with these bytes in the payload.

4.1.2

Baseline Encoding Algorithm Details

This section discusses the details of the Baseline encoding algorithm.

The

Baseline encoding algorithm is created based off of the high-throughput whitespace
steganographic tool Snow [Kwa06], which conceals messages in text documents by

appending whitespaces (0x20h) and tabs (0x09h) to the ends of lines. Because spaces
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and tabs are generally not visible in text viewers, the message is effectively hidden from
casual observers. Figure 16 reveals extra whitespaces which were steganographically
encoded into the test document when all characters in the file are selected. The secret
message is successfully embedded in the whitespace of the test document because there is
no overflow of whitespaces causing line wrapping or other cover traffic distorting effects.
Snow overcomes the issue of line wrapping by keeping track of how many characters are
in each line and only adds spaces or tabs when the length of the line will not exceed the
default line width of 80.

Figure 16: Snow Steganographic Encoding

The Baseline encoding algorithm modifies Snow by exchanging tabs characters,
0x09h, with the character 0x0Fh because tab characters are viewable in mIRC as found in
Experiment #1 (Section 4.1). Figure 17 shows a mIRC screen-capture with tab test
characters displayed as black blocks. The black blocks are clearly viewable in the IRC
channel. Therefore, tabs are not used in the encoding algorithm.

Figure 17: IRC Character Test - Tab 0x09h

To begin encoding a secret into the cover text, a 0x0Fh character is added
immediately after the text on the first line where it fits. This prevents a problem from
occurring if the user enters an extra space after their message since a trailing 0x0Fh must
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be found before extraction begins. The 0x0Fh character cannot be input into an IRC
message other than through socket programming.
Three bits of the secret are encoded at a time through a 3-to-1 multiplexer which
inserts the number of whitespaces according to Table 5. Any message not a multiple of 3
bits is padded by zeroes.

Additional 0x0Fh characters are then used to separate

sequences of whitespaces. For example, a bit sequence of “010” is encoded as “0x0Fh
0x20h 0x20h 0x0Fh”.
Table 5: Bit Sequence 3-to-1 Whitespace Multiplexer
Bit Sequence

# of Whitespaces

000
001
010
011
100
101
110
111

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

The receiver client parses traffic from the sender and performs a de-multiplex
operation to recover the original message. A Wireshark capture of the Baseline encoding
algorithm in operation (minus encryption) is shown in Figure 18. The left capture is from
the sender’s computer and the right is from receiver’s computer. Here, the cover traffic
message “Generated with” is sent to the channel “#test1234q” and is appended with the
covert characters 0x20h and 0x0Fh. The secret message for this test is “hi”. Trailing
0x0Ah and/or 0x0Dh characters denote the ends of messages to IRC applications. Using
Table 5 to verify that the encoding algorithm performed correctly, the secret message
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“hi” is converted to binary, 01101000 01101001b, and every three bits of the secret is
encoded as a series of whitespaces separated by 0x0F characters. The manual encoding
of this secret (“011” “010” “000” “110” “100” “1”) should have the following sequence
of whitespaces: 3, 2, 0, 6, 4, 4 (the last bit is padded with two zeros). The results of the
manual encoding agree with the Wireshark captures.

Figure 18: Baseline Encoding Wireshark Capture

Figure 19 displays the Baseline encoded message in the IRC channel.

The

presence of the steganographically hidden message is concealed to channel observers.

Figure 19: Baseline Encoding IRC Channel Traffic

Estimating the theoretical throughput of the Baseline algorithm is done via the
average case capacity per line and overall encoding ratio. The average capacity per line
is the amount of covert bits that encodes into a single line. Assuming a default line
length of 80 characters and no cover traffic maximizes the covert bits per line. The size
of the secret file in bits is
"<  1$ = 3

(5)

where Y is the number of 0x0Fh characters in the line. Taking the number of whitespace
segments multiplied by 3 gives the encoded bits in the line.
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In the best case scenario, a secret file composed of all 0’s encoded into a line 80
characters in width would have 80 0x0Fh characters. Using (5), the size of this secret file
is 237 bits. In the worse case, a secret file composed of all 1’s would have 11 0x0Fh
characters, resulting in a secret file 30 bits in size encoded into an 80 character line. The
average case capacity per line encodes 134 bits of data into 80 bytes, a 1:4.77 ratio.
The overall Baseline encoding ratio is the size of the secret file in bytes to the
number of bytes in the Baseline encoded file. Assuming a 3-byte secret file, which is
equivalent to 24 bits, the Baseline encoder produces 8 whitespace sequences using the
algorithm in Table 5.

On average, the number of whitespaces per sequence is 4,

producing a total of 32 whitespaces in the encoded file. Every group of whitespaces must
be separated by 0x0Fh characters, requiring 9 total (for 8 whitespace sequences).
Therefore the total size of the Baseline encoded file is 32 + 9 = 41 bytes resulting in a
3:41 ratio. This average encoding ratio is consistent regardless of the size of the secret
file.
4.2

Throughput Encoding Algorithm
4.2.1

Experiment #2: Maximize IRC Throughput

This section describes the experimental methodology and results used to construct
the Throughput encoding algorithm. In this scenario, a fictional adversary intends to
exfiltrate a great amount of information over IRC with little regard to detectability
beyond hiding their covert messages from channel observers.

Maximizing capacity

requires sending the most information per packet as well as per time-slice. Non-viewable
characters found during experiment #1 are used to achieve this high throughput objective.
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The theoretical capacity is determined and compared to the traffic generated by the
Throughput encoder.
Maximizing capacity per packet necessitates encoding every bit of the secret file
as efficiently as possible as well as utilizing entire packet contents for each IRC
transmission.

Section 4.2.2 analyzes these requirements, presents the Throughput

encoding algorithm, and finds the theoretical limit for capacity per packet.
Maximizing capacity per second requires transmitting messages just under the
IRC server throttling limits. Public IRC servers, by default, throttle all incoming traffic
per user or per channel to prevent spammers or bots from disrupting channels or causing
denial of service to legitimate users. The throttle limits are examined by transmitting
packets to the IRC server at regular intervals and observing whether the server relays
them to channel clients or not. This experiment and results are discussed in Sections
4.3.3 and 4.3.4, respectively.
4.2.2

Maximizing Capacity per Packet

Section 4.1 finds the ASCII characters 0x03h, 0x0Fh, 0x16h, and 0x1Fh are nonviewable in the top two IRC client applications. Using these characters, the Throughput
encoding scheme is presented in Table 6. Each byte of the secret file is deconstructed
into four two-bit elements. There are four possible two-bit combinations of data which
are each mapped to the specific IRC hidden characters. In this scheme, 1 byte of secret
data encodes to 4 covert bytes, a 1:4 ratio. This is a significant improvement over the
Baseline encoding algorithm which, on average, requires 41 bytes to encode three bytes
of secret data.
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Table 6: Throughput Encoding Scheme
Character Bits

Byte Encoding

00

0x03

01

0x0F

10

0x16

11

0x1F

Further throughput gains are achieved through a pilot study determining the
maximum packet size of a single IRC message.

Messages of increasing size are

transmitted to the test IRC servers where an observer client determines if the entire
message was relayed correctly. This study finds that the maximum payload size for
response packets is 512 bytes, including IRC protocol header and trailer information.
Response packets are the IRC packet messages forwarded from the IRC server. When
messages are transmitted larger than this size, the IRC server only relays a part of the
message - up to the maximum of 512 bytes (including heading and trailer) to clients in
the channel. This limitation is the system bottleneck in maximizing capacity per packet.
Accounting for the header and trailer bytes which include the end-line characters
(0x0D, 0x0A), user name, channel name, and PRIVMSG command, gives the available
space for payload and covert storage. In the pilot study, 72 bytes of information are
reserved for the IRC protocol. Each Throughput-encoded IRC message uses all available
space after the cover traffic to store the non-viewable steganographic characters, up to the
maximum IRC packet size. Figure 20 shows Wireshark captures of the Throughput
encoder in operation. The image on the left shows the message as it is transmitted to the
IRC server with command “PRIVMSG #test1234q”, the cover traffic “Password”, and
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the embedded covert data. The right image displays the IRC server response packet
containing the IRC protocol header and trailer information, as well as the intact cover
message and the steganographically embedded data. Note the payload length from the
server is maximized at 512 bytes while the transmitted packet is only 461 bytes in length.
This is because more bytes are needed for packet overhead in IRC server response
packets, which include the user and nickname of the sender, than in packets sent to the
server.

Figure 20: Throughput Transmitted Packet (left), Received Packet (right)

Figure 21 shows the Throughput encoded message in the IRC channel. The cover
text “Password” is viewable while the presence of the steganographically hidden message
is concealed to channel observers.

Figure 21: Throughput Encoded Channel Traffic
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The presence of the covert traffic should be non-viewable to channel users,
therefore, messages should contain at least one byte of viewable cover traffic to maintain
the façade of a legitimate user. Assuming 72 bytes of header/trailer data, this allows for a
maximum of 440 bytes for the combined cover traffic and covert storage out of a 512
byte message. Each covert byte represents two bits of the secret file with the Throughput
encoding scheme resulting in a top capacity limit of 880 bits per packet. This upper
capacity limit can be achieved only if there is no cover traffic in the messages and all
available packet space is used for covert encoding. However, the lack of viewable traffic
in a long series of messages could alert channel observers and therefore violates the
covert objective. Similar objections apply to using only one byte of cover traffic per
message, a long series of messages with just a single viewable character could also alert
channel observers. Experimentally, cover traffic with an average line length of 34 bytes
per message is used for all covert channel methods to better compare the techniques.
This cover traffic length is the average length of messages in a large legitimate traffic
sample discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.1.
4.2.3

Maximizing Capacity per Second

This section discusses a pilot study used to determine the maximum number of
packets that can be transmitted during a given time-slice. The goal is to determine the
minimum inter-packet delay separating groups of messages before server throttling
intercedes. The study is performed using the IRC clients in Dayton, Ohio and an IRC
server (irc.servercentral.net) located in Chicago, Illinois. Using a public IRC server, as
opposed to a controlled test server in a simulated environment, introduces realism issues
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that can degrade performance and affect the overall results of the system. However,
realistic environmental conditions will more accurately determine performance
characteristics and real-world limitations. These experiments measure the actual time
messages are received versus their expected arrival time. The sender’s client uses a high
precision software-based microsecond timer to transmit messages at set intervals. On the
receiver’s client, another high precision software-based microsecond timer records when
the sender’s messages are received.
The accuracy of these software-based timers is dependent on the processing load
of the computer running the software. Due to limited OS scheduling resources and
timing constraints with other processes on the computer, the timer mechanism may not
always be granted highest priority and therefore can produce slight deviations. This issue
could be resolved using a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) and specialized
hardware; however this task is out of the scope of this research and is left as future work.
Instead, this test determines the best estimate for timing reliability while adhering to more
realistic operational conditions.
The experiment consists of the sender transmitting 500 messages at 0.5, 1.0, and
2.0 second intervals to a test channel. In preliminary testing, sub-second intervals cause
server throttling, therefore this test has transmission intervals on the order of seconds.
The receiving client waits for messages from the sender and records the time of receipt
for every message. The time difference is calculated by the receiver using the recorded
elapsed time between two packets (IPD) subtracted by the expected elapsed time. Each
test is repeated three times.
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4.2.4

Results and Analysis of Server Throttling Experiments

This section presents the results of the server throttling pilot study and its
conclusions. Table 7 shows the results of a one-variable t-test performed on each of the
experimental configurations of the study. The table shows the number of messages sent
over all trials, the mean time IPD since the last received message, standard deviation,
standard error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the mean in seconds.
Table 7: Timing Reliability for Three Time Interval Configurations
N
Standard
Confidence
Mean
Standard
Error of
Interval
Configuration (500 Messages
IPD
Deviation
* 3 Trials)
the Mean
(95%)
(0.888,
0.5 Second
1500
1.067
2.426
0.092
1.248)
Interval
1.0 Second
Interval

1500

1.000

0.028

0.001

(0.999,
1.002)

2.0 Second
Interval

1500

2.000

0.028

0.001

(1.999,
2.002)

Looking at the table, the timing reliability for the 0.5 second interval
configuration is the least reliable case with a mean much greater than the expected
interval and a standard deviation of 2.426 seconds. Examining the plotted data for this
configuration shows the reason for the discrepancy in Figure 22. The results from all
three 0.5 second trials as the receiver accepts the server IRC messages. The Y-axis
displays the variance, in seconds, between each message’s actual time of receipt
subtracted by the expected time of 0.5 seconds. The x-axis displays the message number.
While the majority of the messages have a very small variance from the expected 0.5
second IPD, approximately every 20 messages results in the IRC server throttling the
traffic to the channel. While the server throttles messages, no messages are serviced
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resulting in less than 250 messages received out of the total 500 expected. These results
indicate that 0.5 seconds is an unreliable timing interval due to frequent packet loss from
server throttling.

Figure 22: Timing Variance for the 0.5 Second Trials

The results from the 1.0 and 2.0 second interval configurations produce much
more consistent results as indicated by their 95% confidence intervals. The results from
the 1.0 second interval plot in Figure 23 show its packet timing reliability.

Most

messages are received in the 0 to ±0.16 seconds time variance from expected. There are
two outlier data points at the end of trial 3 that take approximately 0.6 seconds longer to
receive than expected. This delay is likely caused by packet loss and retransmissions
since the IRC messages use the TCP protocol to guarantee delivery.
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Figure 23: Timing Variance for the 1.0 Second Trials

Based on the results of this experiment, the Throughput encoding algorithm can
utilize inter-packet delays as small as 1.0 second without being inhibited by server
throttling to achieve maximum transmissions per second.

The 2.0 second interval

provided little additional robustness, so the 1.0 second interval is chosen.
The Throughput encoder allows an adversary to send fewer messages to transmit
large amounts of secret information quickly at the expense of increasing the size of the
messages. Since the transmission rate and packet sizes are maximized, this case is, by
far, the noisiest. Every packet transmitted may provide a clue of the covert transfer to
network administrators or forensic specialists.
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4.3

Stealth Encoding Algorithm
4.3.1

Experiment #3: Identify Legitimate IRC Traffic Distribution

This section describes an experiment which identifies a legitimate IRC traffic
distribution for use in the Stealth encoding algorithm. The intuition behind the Stealth
algorithm is to classify observed IPD IRC traffic distributions and then mimic the shape
of that distribution to decrease detectability. To determine the distribution of legitimate
IRC traffic, chat logs of an observed IRC channel, #teamliquid, were captured from
November 1 – 3, 2010. The key measurement in this study is IPD. In total, the chat logs
contain 6,734 human messages. The probability density function (PDF) of the observed
traffic is shown in Figure 24. By visual inspection, the histogram appears to follow a
lognormal curve where there is a large spike in the smaller IPD frequencies which then
asymptotically approaches zero as the IPD values increase.

Figure 24: PDF of Observed IRC Traffic

An analysis of the inter-packet delays fits the observed distribution to various
other distributions. The fitting process uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to
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determine the parameters for each model.

The model with the smallest root mean

squared error (RMSE), which measures the difference between the model and the
estimated distribution, is chosen as the traffic model. The model selection process is
automated and performed offline using the R statistical program [Rpr10].
The observed IRC traffic pattern fits closest to a lognormal distribution which has
a PDF of
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The mean, µ, is 1.370 and standard deviation, σ, is 1.122. By definition, the log of a
lognormally distributed function is normally distributed. To verify this assumption, the
normal Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot of the log transformed data versus normal
theoretical quantiles is plotted. As shown in Figure 25, the plot follows a strong normal
distribution between the -2 and +2 theoretical quantiles. Data points outside of this range
are not expected to be strongly modeled in the covert timing channel framework;
however, as this is the best fitting model, it is hypothesized to be strong enough to avoid
shape-based detection.

Figure 25: Q-Q Plot of Log Observed Traffic versus Normal Distribution
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Figure 26 shows the best-fitting lognormal distribution in red over the observed
histogram of the legitimate traffic. By visual inspection from Figures 25 and 26, there is
strong confidence that legitimate traffic distribution follows the best fit curve.

Figure 26: PDF of Observed IRC Traffic versus Best Fit Curve (red)

4.3.2

Stealth Encoding Algorithm Details

To evade shape and regularity detection measures, the Stealth encoding algorithm
should emulate the legitimate traffic distribution.

This traffic has a log-normal

distribution with mean µ = 1.370 and standard deviation σ = 1.122. The GNU Scientific
Library (GSL) C function, gsl_ran_gaussian [GNU10], generates Gaussian values that
match the log of the observed traffic’s pdf.

The choice to model the Gaussian

distribution instead of the Log-normal one is arbitrary since the exponential of the
Gaussian distribution gives its Log-normal, and there is a high confidence in this property
of the GSL C functions based on preliminary testing and its 15 year heritage.
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The Stealth encoding pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.

This algorithm

creates a covert timing channel that models the pdf of the observed network traffic. A
while loop continues as long as there is an unread bit, b, within the covert file. Next, a
randomly generated data point from the Gaussian distribution is calculated, x. If the
unread bit, b, is 0 and the value of x is less than or equal to the mean, then an IRC packet
is transmitted after &  seconds. Otherwise, the IRC packet is sent after & "OF$ seconds.
On the other hand, if the unread bit is 1 and the value of x is less than or equal to the
mean, then an IRC packet is sent after & "OF$ seconds. If the value of x is greater than

the mean, then the packet is transmitted after &  seconds. Finally, the encoded bit is
marked as read, B, to prevent it from being processed again. Essentially, this algorithm
places all 0 bit delays to the left of the mean and all 1 bits to the right.

Algorithm 1 Stealth Encoder:

while PQ R S:T&%, ?+)&
Generate random Gaussian value, x
if b = 0
if x <= µ
Transmit after &  seconds
else if x > µ
Transmit after & "OF$ seconds
else if b = 1
if x <= µ
Transmit after & "OF$ seconds
else if x > µ
Transmit after &  seconds
Mark b as B
end while
The equation 2U  # calculates the value on the opposite side of the mean from x

with equal distance from the mean. Figure 27 graphically displays this property with a
sample Gaussian distribution, µ = 0, σ = 1. Assuming an x value of 1 is chosen, "2 V
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0$  1  1 which has the same distance from the mean as the starting x value. Given a
roughly equal proportion of 1 and 0 bits in a given file, this algorithm ensures that the
encoded values are always centered about the mean.

Length = 1

Length = 1

Figure 27: Sample Gaussian Distribution

The Stealth decoder pseudocode, shown in Algorithm 2, decodes packets based
on when they arrive in relation to the mean. First, the decoding client waits for a
message from the sending client, clients. Once this first message is received, future
packets from clients are analyzed until they disconnect from the server. Each packet’s
timing is recorded relative to the previous packet to determine the observed IPD. When
the IPD is less than or equal to the mean, µ, that it is interpreted as an encoded 0 bit,
otherwise the IPD is interpreted as an encoded 1 bit.
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Algorithm 2 Stealth Decoder:

wait until P message from clients
while clients is connected to server
Observe clients message IPDs

if IPD <= µ
Record encoded bit = 0
else if IPD > µ
Record encoded bit = 1
end while
4.3.3

Reed-Solomon Forward Error Correction

In preliminary testing, the WAN-US and WAN-EU scenarios perform with a BER
of 0.3% and 3.1%, respectively. In the WAN-EU scenario, long latencies and bursts of
packets from the server cause frequent bit flips.

Bit errors from packet drops and

duplicates are not observed due to the reliable packet delivery from TCP/IP below IRC in
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) stack. Reliably transmitting a 3 KB file with
this BER is unacceptable because even one bit error is enough to prevent successfully
decoding the file. Therefore, forward error correction is examined to improve reliability.
The Reed-Solomon forward error correction algorithm is used to improve the
reliability of the Stealth encoder algorithm. The Reed-Solomon algorithm has several
properties that make it attractive for this application. For one, it is used to detect and
correct multiple bursts of errors in applications ranging from deep-space communications
to CD reading [PoH92]. The Reed-Solomon algorithm treats multiple bit errors within a
single byte as one error.

Second, the amount of overhead used by the parity is

configurable. Every byte of parity can detect one byte of errors and every two bytes of
parity can correct one byte [WsB94]. This allows the amount of parity needed to correct
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the observed errors to be adjusted without significantly affecting throughput. Third,
errors in the parity do not negatively affect the decoding of the message, as long as the
number of parity bytes is greater than two times the total byte errors in the codeword. A
codeword is the bytes of data plus the number of bytes of parity. Reed-Solomon codes
are represented by the codeword-message pair (N, K) where there are (N-K) parity bytes.
The Reed-Solomon encoding is performed after RC4 encryption, just prior to the
transmission phase. Fixing each codeword size at 64 bytes for every 56 bytes of the
message, a (64, 56) encoding, provides 8 bytes for parity. Accounting for the 8 extra
bytes needed for parity for every 56 message bytes increases the duration for file transfers
and reduces the throughput by 12.5% versus traffic without the forward error correction.
Eight parity bytes corrects up to 4 byte errors or 6.25% of byte errors per codeword. In
the preliminary Stealth encoding trials without Reed-Solomon, the worst case BER
observed is 3.1%, therefore the (64, 56) encoding can correct errors over 2 times the
worst BER observed in the trials.
4.4

Summary
This chapter presents the design and experiments used to construct and test the

VANISH system. The first section finds ASCII characters which are not viewable over
IRC using the top two leading IRC chat clients for Windows and Linux. The Baseline
algorithm is discussed which steganographically hides information over IRC. Then,
experiments to determine the highest throughput per message and per second out of each
IRC for the Throughput encoding algorithm are presented. Finally, Section 4.4 identifies
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the distribution parameters that most closely resembles the legitimate IRC traffic pattern
and describes the details of the Stealth encoding algorithm.
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V.

T

Results and Analysis

his chapter presents and analyzes experimental results from the three encoding
configurations under test. First, an overall analysis of the inter-packet delay (IPD)

characteristics is discussed in Section 5.1. Next, the results of the throughput and bit
error rate (BER) performance metrics are presented in Section 5.2. The results of the
detectability performance of each configuration are given in Section 5.3. Finally, the
chapter is concluded in Section 5.4.
5.1

Results and Analysis of IPD Characteristics
This section presents the results of the IPD statistical summary for the legitimate

traffic as well as the summary of the Baseline, Throughput, and Stealth encoded traffic
experiments for comparison.
Table 8 shows the results of a one-variable t-test on legitimate IRC traffic samples
collected between 8am – 5pm, November 1 – 3, 2010 for comparison with the
experimental results. As found in Chapter 4, the legitimate traffic most closely follows a
log-normal distribution. However, data analysis using t-test requires normally distributed
data; therefore the legitimate network traffic is logarithmically transformed for
normalization. To report the results in seconds, an exponential transformation is applied:
<  & GH  . Estimating the values this way produces the geometric mean and geometric
standard deviation of the legitimate sample. The number of packets, mean IPD, standard
deviation, and 95% confidence interval are reported in seconds.
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Table 8: Legitimate Traffic Statistical Summary
Confidence
N
Mean
Standard
Interval
(Packets)
IPD
Deviation
(95%)
Legitimate
6748
3.972
3.074
(3.865, 4.081)
Traffic

In each experiment, the sender covertly transmits one of three randomly generated
3 kilobyte files to the IRC server during a single trial. The set of experiments consists of
three trials per configuration for each network scenario using an IRC server located in
Chicago IL, referred to as WAN-US, and in Amsterdam NL, referred to as WAN-EU.
The server forwards all messages to the IRC channel where the receiver records the
messages and packet timing properties.

Identical cover traffic is used for each

configuration’s trials averaging 34 bytes per packet. The content of the cover traffic is
arbitrary, but in actual use it should be germane to the channel to avoid arousing
suspicion. A one-variable t-test is performed on the results shown in Tables 9 and 10.
The tables include number of packets, mean IPD, standard deviation, and the 95%
confidence interval for each configuration in seconds.
Table 9: WAN-US Inter-Packet Delay Statistical Summary
Confidence
N
Mean
Standard
Component Secret
Interval
3 KB (Packets)
IPD
Deviation
Under Test
(95%)
File 1
1289
1.001
0.037
(0.999, 1.002)
File 2
1289
1.001
0.015
(0.999, 1.001)
Baseline
File 3
1290
1.001
0.031
(1.000, 1.002)
File 1
30
1.006
0.033
(1.002, 1.008)
30
1.005
0.033
(1.002, 1.009)
Throughput File 2
File 3
30
1.006
0.032
(1.001, 1.007)
File 1
27648
3.943
3.175
(3.637, 4.275)
File 2
27648
3.968
3.059
(3.753, 4.199)
Stealth
File 3
27648
4.053
3.040
(3.786, 4.339)
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Table 10: WAN-EU Inter-Packet Delay Statistical Summary
Secret
Confidence
Component
N
Mean
Standard
File
Interval
Under Test
(Packets)
IPD
Deviation
3 KB
(95%)
File 1
1289
1.001
0.181
(0.991, 1.011)
File 2
1289
1.001
0.166
(0.992, 1.010)
Baseline
File 3
1290
1.001
0.208
(0.990, 1.012)
File 1
30
1.005
0.182
(0.987, 1.022)
30
1.005
0.166
(0.989, 1.021)
Throughput File 2
File 3
30
1.004
0.161
(0.989, 1.019)
File 1
27648
4.028
3.174
(3.714, 4.370)
File 2
27648
3.971
3.046
(3.754, 4.202)
Stealth
File 3
27648
3.975
3.039
(3.671, 4.305)

The amount of time required to send 27,648 packets with the Stealth
configuration and its slow average transmission time is excessive. Therefore, the Stealth
analysis uses 100-byte secret files, resulting in 1,024 packets per trial. In preliminary
tests, changing the size of the secret file does not significantly change the IPD statistical
properties of the transfer.
Figure 28 shows the 95% confidence intervals of legitimate traffic compared to
the Stealth encoder results for both server configurations. The following qualitative
observations are noted:
•

The Baseline configuration encodes secret files #1 and 2 into 1289 packets and
File #3 into 1290 packets. The discrepancy in packets is because the Baseline
algorithm does not treat all secret bytes equally: the more one bits in the secret
increases the amount of whitespace needed to encode them. Given the 3 kilobyte
secret files, the covert byte per packet ratio for the Baseline algorithm is
approximately 1:0.429: every byte of secret data encodes into approximately
0.429 of a packet.
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•

The Throughput configuration encodes all three 3 kilobyte files into 30 packets.
Unlike the Baseline algorithm, the Throughput method encodes all bytes equally
in the message regardless of the number of zero or one bits. The Throughput
algorithm also increases the available space per packet for the covert message
using non-viewable ASCII characters. It performs with an encoding ratio of
1:0.01 secret bytes per packet: every byte of secret data encodes into onehundredth of a packet.

•

The Stealth configuration encodes all three 3 kilobyte files into 27,648 packets
with forward error correction (FEC) enabled, 24,000 without. Since every bit
equates to one packet transfer in this method, there are a total of 3,648 extra
packets needed for overhead from the Reed-Solomon parity. The benefits and
drawbacks from adding FEC are discussed in more detail in Section 6.2 where
throughput and reliability are analyzed.

Overall, the Stealth configuration

performs with an encoding ratio of 1:9.216 secret bytes per packet: every byte of
secret data results into approximately 9.216 packets.
•

In both server scenarios, regardless of the encoding configuration, the mean IPD
difference from transferring the files is minimal: 1.41% in the worst case during
the WAN-EU Stealth experiments.

Thus, the contents of the secret file are

independent from the rate at which the covert transfer takes place. The results
agree with the design for each covert method, where the contents of the secret file
are treated as a black box enabling them to encode any file type and contents.
•

The mean IPD for the Baseline and Throughput configurations are approximately
equal in both server scenarios, within 0.4%. However, the standard deviations in
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the WAN-EU case are 5 to 11 times greater than with the WAN-US sever. This
same increase in standard deviation is not present in the Stealth trials; therefore it
is likely that this increase is due to the Baseline and Throughput configuration’s
attempt to transmit packets at the constant rate of one per second. It is important
to note that as the latency and delay increases in the WAN-EU scenario, the
variability of the one second transmission intervals is amplified.
•

All of the Stealth configuration trials produce traffic whose mean IPD is within
the 95% CI of the legitimate traffic sample. This data alone is not sufficient to
say that the distributions are similar, which is answered in the detectability
metrics in Section 6.3. However, this figure does point to the similarity of the
means. The deviations from the mean can be attributed to several factors: the
accuracy of the distribution number generator, the presence of lost and
retransmitted packets incurring extra delays, the workload of the IRC server at the
time of the experiments (higher workload would incur extra delay in routing
packets to the channel), and network latencies between the sender to IRC server
and IRC server to receiver.
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Figure 28: Legitimate Traffic versus Stealth Results

5.2

Throughput and BER Results
Two metrics for bandwidth are collected for each encoding method: capacity per

packet (CPP) and capacity per second (CPS). Capacity per packet is derived by dividing
the size of the secret file in bits by the number of packets used to transmit the secret.
Capacity per second takes the number of covert information in bits, divided by the time
required to complete the transmission.
The BER is determined after the transmission by comparing the original bits of
the encoded secret file to the received bits of the file after forward error correction. If a
received bit does not match its transmitted bit, either through omission, duplication, or
bit-flip, it is counted as an error. The BER is found by dividing the number of errors by
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the total number of packets sent. The following observations are found based on the
throughput and BER results in Tables 11 and 12:
Table 11: Throughput and BER Results – WAN-US
Test Server Scenario
System Metric
Capacity per
Packet
Capacity per
Second
Bit Error Rate

Secret
3 KB
File 1
File 2
File 3
File 1
File 2
File 3
File 1
File 2
File 3

WAN-US
Baseline

Throughput

Stealth

18.619
18.619
18.604
18.583
18.589
18.567
0%
0%
0%

803.733
800.000
800.000
802.502
798.801
798.961
0%
0%
0%

0.999
0.999
0.999
0.137
0.134
0.134
0%
0%
0%

Table 12: Throughput and BER Results - WAN-EU
Test Server Scenario
System Metric
Capacity per
Packet (bits)
Capacity per
Second (bits)
Bit Error Rate

Secret
3 KB
File 1
File 2
File 3
File 1
File 2
File 3
File 1
File 2
File 3

WAN-EU
Baseline

Throughput

Stealth

18.619
18.619
18.604
18.587
18.587
18.572
0%
0%
0%

803.733
800.000
800.001
802.983
804.829
799.094
0%
0%
0%

0.999
0.999
0.999
0.126
0.133
0.132
0%
0%*
0%

* Three uncorrected bit errors after FEC are found in one trial but are too small to report
with 3 significant digits after the decimal; the aggregate BER for File 2 is approximately
36.168x10-8.
•

The throughput from each configuration is similar despite using different
randomly generated files; within 5% in the worst case. This is by design, since
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each encoding algorithm is designed to be content independent. Each secret file is
deconstructed into its binary form prior to encoding; the transmission speeds are
therefore not dependent on the secret file contents.
•

The throughput of the File #3 experiment in the Baseline configuration is 0.08%
less than the other two file transfers. The reduction in CPS is due to one more
packet being needed to encode the file and therefore another second of total
transmission time. The slight reduction in CPP is due to the Baseline method
encoding the contents of File #3 less efficiently than the other two files. The
Baseline algorithm uses more message space to encode consecutive one bits
instead of zero bits.

•

The Throughput configuration has the greatest CPP and CPS of the three
methods. It boasts approximately 43 times more CPS and CPP than the Baseline
encoding method and dwarfs the Stealth method’s average CPP and CPS by 802
and 6155 times, respectively. The cover traffic, on average, uses approximately
34 bytes per message. This reduced the available capacity per packet for the
Baseline and Throughput methods.

•

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Throughput method has a maximum capacity per
packet of 440 bytes when no cover traffic is used. These experiments use cover
traffic with an average of 34 bytes per message, leaving 406 bytes available for
the steganographic channel. The Throughput algorithm encodes two bits of the
secret file into a single non-viewable ASCII character (one byte); therefore the
maximum capacity with this cover traffic is 812 bits per packet. The results show
that this method approaches the limit but never maximizes capacity per packet.
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One reason for this is because the last message of the covert transfer is only
partially filled with the remaining covert data, which reduces the overall capacity
results.
•

Unlike the Baseline and Throughput configurations, the Stealth method does not
rely on the available space in an IRC packet to covertly communicate; therefore
its throughput is not affected by the size of the cover traffic per message but on
maintaining the shape of its distribution.

•

The Baseline and Throughput configurations perform with 100% accuracy during
all trials regardless of the test server. The reason they have such high reliability is
because their covert methods utilize the packet contents of IRC messages, which
rely on TCP/IP for data integrity and guaranteed packet delivery.

•

The reliability of the Stealth encoded traffic is significantly improved with ReedSolomon FEC. In preliminary Stealth trials without FEC, the worst case BER
observed is 3.1% in the WAN-EU scenario. With Reed-Solomon error correction
in a (64, 56) configuration, only one trial, WAN-EU File #2, produced errors that
were not correctable. There are a number of possible causes for the increased
number of errors in this test: lost and retransmitted packets between the European
server and US-based clients, increased network latency between hops in the chain,
or increased IRC server workload can cause network delays increasing packet
arrival times and lead to inaccuracies in the decoding process.

•

Improving the Stealth method’s reliability with FEC reduces its overall
throughput because of the extra bytes needed for parity. The Stealth method’s
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results show that the increased overhead is worth the tradeoff because it achieves
very high reliability.
5.3

Detection Results
Detectability is determined based on the shape and variance of the experimental

methods.

To examine the shape of a distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is

performed, which is a non-parametric goodness-of-fit test. The regularity test is used to
examine the variance of the traffic pattern. The results from the Stealth encoding are of
primary interest in this section because it was designed to evade shape-based detection,
unlike the Baseline and Throughput configurations.
The legitimate traffic sample is compared with traffic captures from each
encoding experiment. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is run 100 times against the results
from each trial and with randomly generated distributions with the mean and standard
deviation of the best fit distribution from the legitimate traffic. Each test produces a onesided p-value, the measure of evidence against the null hypothesis that the two compared
traffic distributions are equal. The smaller the p-value, the greater the certainty that the
distributions are different. High p-values suggest that the data is consistent with the null
hypothesis but not necessarily that the two distributions are equal.

In general,

interpreting the meaning of a particular p-value is challenging because the p-value
confidence levels can vary from situation to situation. This thesis uses the suggested pvalue weighting scale in Figure 29, where a p-value from 0 to 0.01 shows convincing
evidence of a difference, 0.01 to 0.05 is moderately convincing, 0.05 to 0.10 is suggestive
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but inconclusive, and values greater than 0.10 show less evidence of a difference but does
not rule out the possibility.

Figure 29: p-Value Weighting Scale [RaS02]

The regularity test assesses the variance of the data set’s IPD. A higher regularity
score above an established threshold, depending on the traffic of interest, indicates that
the traffic pattern has more variability over time, while lower scores indicate less
variability. For the regularity test, a sample is separated into sets of windows of size
w=25 (larger window sizes were also tested and had little effect on the results). Then the
standard deviation of each set is computed. The regularity score is the standard deviation
of the pair wise differences between each σi and σj for all sets i<j or
1σ2  σ3 1
%&'()*%+,-  ./ 0
4 , + 6 7, 8+, 7
σ2

(7)

where σi is the standard deviation of the ith window. The greater the difference in
standard deviation between pairs of windows (greater variance), the greater the traffic’s
overall regularity score.
Establishing a baseline for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS-test) and regularity tests
is important to determine whether the covert methods would remain undetectable in the
legitimate data stream or not. The KS-test p-value and regularity score are computed for
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the legitimate traffic, shown in Table 13. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value of 0.203
indicates that the legitimate traffic distribution is consistent with its own best-fitting
traffic distribution. This particular test is not necessary because the best fit distribution is
already found to be in agreement with the legitimate traffic in Chapter 4, but is included
for completeness. A regularity score of 3.746 serves as the baseline for the experimental
configurations.

To effectively remain undetectable to the regularity test, the covert

channels should produce a regularity score similar to the legitimate traffic; especially
high or low values could provide evidence of covert activity.
Table 13: Legitimate Traffic Detection Results
Legitimate
Traffic
KS-Test p-value,
0.203
mean 100
Regularity Score,
3.746
w = 25

Figure 30 shows a graphical display of the standard deviations for each window
of the observed legitimate traffic. Most of the windows in the sample have standard
deviations smaller than 40; however, a small percentage of the windows are significantly
larger.

Figure 30: Legitimate Traffic Variance
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The detectability results from the experiments are shown in Table 14 and 15. To
get an accurate regularity score for the Throughput case, 40 kilobyte files are used since
the 3 kilobyte files only produce 30 packets (less than two full windows at w=25). Figure
31 shows how the generated Stealth traffic (red bars) approximates the best fit curve of
the legitimate traffic (black line) in the WAN-US and WAN-EU scenario. The following
observations and interpretations are derived from the results in Tables 14 and 15 and
Figures 31, 32, and 33:
Table 14: Detection Results - WAN-US
Secret
Baseline
Throughput
Detection Metric
File
File 1
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
KS-Test p-value,
File 2
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
mean 100
File 3
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
File 1
3.413
2.908
Regularity
File 2
2.692
5.125
Score,
w = 25
File 3
7.141
1.318

Table 15: Detection Results - WAN-EU
Secret
Detection Metric
Baseline
Throughput
File
File 1
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
KS-Test p-value,
File 2
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
mean 100
File 3
< 2.2e-16
< 2.2e-16
File 1
9.344
19.036
Regularity
File 2
14.695
14.574
Score,
w = 25
File 3
20.207
5.260

•

Stealth
0.579
0.581
0.509
0.825
0.696
0.836

Stealth
0.577
0.600
0.619
0.764
1.015
0.651

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-values for the Baseline and Throughput
configurations show that there is convincing evidence that the data sets are
different. The difference between the traffic patterns produced by these encoding
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configurations is significantly different from the legitimate traffic as to
convincingly rule out chance.

Based on these results, the Throughput and

Baseline encoded traffic are easily detected with the KS-test. The reason why the
Baseline and Throughput configurations fail to produce a traffic distribution
similar to the legitimate traffic is because they are designed to transmit packets as
fast as possible over the channel, making no attempts to prevent shape-based
detection.
•

There is significant similarity between the p-values for each configuration despite
using different randomly generated files and varying server configurations for the
Stealth traffic.

This is by design; the shape of the covert channel traffic is

designed to be independent from the contents of the secret file. Further, the
additional latency in the WAN-EU scenario does not perturb the traffic
distribution enough that it is sufficiently different from the legitimate traffic, as
seen in Figure 31.
•

Through visual inspection of the probability density of the log-transformed
Stealth encoded traffic in Figure 31, the Stealth traffic follows the shape of the
legitimate traffic pattern closely in both server configurations which is
corroborated by their high KS-test p-values. The increased latency in the WANEU scenario has little effect on the shape.

•

The Stealth encoded traffic produces traffic consistent with the best fit
distribution of the legitimate traffic with Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values ranging
from 0.509 to 0.619. This is because the Stealth algorithm uses the best-fitting
parameters of the legitimate sample to maintain the shape of the distribution.
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Based off of the p-value weighting scale in Figure 29, the Stealth method is not
detectable using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov method.

Figure 31: Stealth Probability Density (red bars) versus Legitimate Traffic Density (black
line) - Log Transformed, WAN-US (left) and WAN-EU (right)

•

The regularity scores for the legitimate traffic are, on average, 4.69 times greater
than the regularity of the Stealth traffic in the WAN-US and WAN-EU scenarios,
as a whole. The significant difference in regularity scores shows that Stealth
encoded traffic can be detected with this metric and therefore fails the regularity
test. The primary reason why the Stealth encoded traffic fails is because its
algorithm is only designed to defeat shape-based, as opposed to regularity-based,
detection.

As such, the random number generator that produces IPD values

matching the shape of the legitimate traffic does not account for the regularity of
the original traffic sample.

This issue can be overcome by calculating the

regularity as IPDs are computed and adjusting the delay such that it emulates the
legitimate traffic’s regularity score. This task is left for future research.
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•

The regularity results from the WAN-EU test scenarios are, on average, 1.03
times greater than their WAN-US counterparts in the Stealth configuration, 3.34
times greater with the Baseline, and 4.15 times greater with the Throughput
configuration. The wide range of regularity score differences suggests that high
latency scenarios with fixed packet IPDs have a greater effect on this metric than
with varying IPDs, as is the case with the Stealth configuration. These variances
produce noticeable differences in the traffic regularity, increasing detectability if
the regularity scores become significantly higher or lower than the legitimate
traffic.

•

The higher regularity scores for the Baseline method show it has more variance
than the Stealth method but less than the legitimate traffic. Examining Figures
30, 32 and 33, however, reveals that the greatest standard deviation for the
Baseline method is approximately 0.04 seconds; much smaller than the legitimate
and Stealth traffic samples. Given that the Baseline scenario’s design to transmit
packets at static one second intervals, the high regularity score does not agree
with the results in [CBS04]. In that research, a significantly lower regularity
score than a legitimate sample shows that the sample has less variance, indicating
a possible covert channel with a statically set traffic pattern. These results show
that the regularity score is not as closely tied to the variance of the windows as
originally thought. The Baseline method produces closer regularity scores to the
legitimate traffic than the dynamic time intervals of the Stealth method, despite
the sample having much less variance.
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•

One factor considered is that regularity may not be a strong secondary metric for
detecting these covert channels.

However, regularity is tied to the standard

deviation of each sample window.

The average standard deviation for all

windows of the legitimate traffic gives a value of 12.358 versus 10.119 for the
Stealth, 0.073 for the Baseline, and 0.075 for the Throughput configurations. This
shows that the average standard deviation of the Stealth encoded traffic is actually
similar to the legitimate traffic to within 20%, whereas the Baseline and
Throughput configurations are significantly different from the legitimate traffic.
Given the similarities between the average standard deviations of the legitimate
and Stealth traffic, the difference in regularity scores is counterintuitive. Further
analysis and examination of the regularity formula against various sets of data is
left for future research.

Figure 32: Stealth WAN-US Traffic Regularity
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Figure 33: Baseline WAN-US Traffic Regularity
5.4

Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from each of the three covert

hiding method’s experiments.

An overall analysis and discussion of the results is

presented. A statistical analysis of the performance metrics for each test is performed.
Finally, the detectability of the methods is evaluated using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
regularity tests. The results show that Throughput configuration exfiltrates data 43 times
faster than the Baseline and 6155 times faster than the Stealth configuration. When
maintaining a low detectability profile is the priority, the Stealth encoder is able to avoid
shape-based detection, unlike the Throughput and Baseline configurations, but is
vulnerable to regularity detection.
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VI.

T

Conclusions

his chapter presents the overall conclusions of this research. Section 6.1 provides
several recommendations for extending this research. The significance of the

research is discussed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 summarizes the findings from the
experimental results and determines if the research objectives have been met.
6.1

Recommendations for Future Research
There are many possible directions for future research. Expanding the system to

other unexplored text-based protocols such as America Instant Messenger (AIM),
Microsoft Network (MSN) Messenger, Trillian, the Facebook chat client, and even cell
phone text messages may show promise as steganographic or covert timing channel
avenues.
Compression is another avenue which could drastically improve covert
transmission throughput. In a preliminary study, files compressed with the PAQ8PX
routine are significantly smaller than other compression schemes. Compression was not
used to more accurately measure encoding throughput. Compression would skew the
encoding performance since different files of the same size compress to different sizes.
A hybrid covert channel which utilizes IPD and steganography techniques to
achieve higher throughput while retaining its detection resistance to shape-based
countermeasures could be developed.
Improving the detection resistance of the system is another valuable area for
future research. The Stealth algorithm could model a traffic sample’s regularity by
keeping track of the generated traffic’s regularity as it is running and adjusting IPD
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values accordingly. The results obtained herein indicate a possible problem with the
published formula for calculating regularity [CBS04]. Therefore, an analysis of this
formula is in order to determine if it is a good measure of regularity. Other possible
detectability improvements may include e-similarity, entropy, conditional entropy and
corrected conditional entropy measures.
Although many hours of chat data were collected and analyzed, a larger corpus
with a wider variety of channels and channel participants would be beneficial for
modeling various sized chat rooms. To this end, further contributions of chat profiles are
encouraged to progress this research. Additionally, a system which analyzes live traffic
to produce an equivalent best fitting distribution would be ideal because less preparation
would be needed to create undetectable covert timing channel traffic.
Lastly, future research should investigate covert channel encoding methods that
do not rely on the entropy of the secret file, i.e., files that have significantly more one or
zero bits than the other should not have a negative effect on the detection resistance of the
method. This is one limitation of the covert timing channel herein. However, the count
of ‘1’ and ‘0’ bits in the randomly generated test files happened to be approximately
equal (within 300 bits in a 3 kilobyte file), and was not significant enough to affect the
detectability.
6.2

Research Summary
This research develops the Variable Advanced Network IRC Stealth Handler

(VANISH) system which covertly exfiltrates information over IRC. The implementation
of the covert channel methods is split into two main parts.
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The first consists of

techniques that use non-viewable ASCII characters in IRC messages to covertly transmit
data, specifically the Baseline and Throughput methods. The Baseline method uses
whitespaces to steganographically encode data into IRC messages. The Throughput
method attempts to maximize capacity per packet and capacity per second using other
non-viewable characters in IRC messages. The second part uses methods for minimizing
detectability of the channel traffic such that it would evade the shape-based detection
tests, referred to as the Stealth method. The shape of a legitimate traffic sample is
analyzed and used as the basis for the shaping algorithm. In this way, all IRC covert
channel messages from the sending client are used to maintain the shape of the legitimate
sample.
Channel throughput, reliability, and detectability are evaluated with each covert
channel using public IRC servers located domestically and abroad. Empirically, the
results show that the Throughput method exfiltrates covert data at nearly 800 bits per
second (bps) compared to only 18 bps with the Baseline method and 0.13 bps for the
Stealth method. This data rate can be further improved by eliminating or reducing the
amount of cover traffic, up to a maximum of 880 bits per second.
Reed-Solomon forward error correction (FEC) is implemented on the Stealth
encoder using a (64, 56) configuration to improve its reliability. Prior to implementing
FEC, bit errors approached 3.1% in WAN-EU tests. Since a single bit error in the
received message can cause data corruption, rendering the message unreadable, FEC is
used. The results show nearly 100% data transfer reliability with minimal additional
overhead.
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The detectability results show that the Stealth encoded traffic successfully evades
shape-based detection based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. However, the variance of
the Stealth traffic is detectable with the regularity test because it produces traffic with a
significantly lower regularity score than the legitimate traffic. Given the wide ranging
regularity scores in high-latency environments, regularity may not be the metric of choice
for detecting covert channels.
6.3

Significance of Research
The primary motivation for this research is that no tools exist for transmitting or

detecting covert or steganographic channels over IRC streams. However, botnet masters
are expected to begin using steganography in 2011 [Lew10]. Therefore, it is important
that steganographic methods and detection techniques over IRC and peer-to-peer
protocols be analyzed.

Given the covert channel methods proposed, certain

countermeasures can be instituted to detect or prevent these methods. Creating deeppacket inspection rules on a network gateway scanning for specific non-viewable ASCII
characters in IRC messages can be one effective detection technique. Additionally,
approaches maximizing stealth require a significant amount of time and messages to
transmit covert secrets. Therefore, time or message restrictions enforced on a per-client
basis would further slow down the covert channel’s throughput.

Finally, and most

importantly, organizations using IRC should restrict connections to only trusted or
internal servers to prevent unauthorized entry and examine server logs.

Further

protection measures include password protected channels and Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
encrypted traffic.

91

This research presents methods for embedding covert messages into an IRC
stream using several different approaches. While IRC messages are generally small in
nature, they present a clear and present danger to businesses and academic institutions
which allow IRC traffic through their communications network.

The novelty of

VANISH stems from its dual purpose design enabling it to achieve either high capacity or
high detection resistance over IRC depending on the needs of the user.
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